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Lieberman: Should Lawyers be Free to Publicly Excoriate Judges?

SHOULD LAWYERS BE FREE TO PUBLICLY
EXCORIATE JUDGES?
Hal R. Lieberman*
"[Jhunk justice."' "'[R]acist."' 2 "'[A]nti-semitism."' 3 Appellate
judges are 'the whores who became madams.".'4 "'[S]onofabitch." 's
Inflammatory attacks on judges and the judiciary, like the foregoing
lawyers' comments reported in the press, are becoming more common.
Should such remarks be tolerated under the First Amendment, or are
there legitimate limits? From this Author's perspective in the field of
disciplinary enforcement, lawyers do not have an unlimited right to make
false or reckless personal attacks against sitting judges in the press. Such
attacks are proscribed by various provisions of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ("ABA Code") and its successor, the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("ABA Rules"), as well as by case
law. Additionally, public policy considerations weigh heavily against
lawyers communicating to the press whatever mean-spirited thoughts or
feelings about judges that may momentarily pop into their heads.

* A.B., University of Chicago (1964); J.D., Harvard Law School (1967). Mr. Lieberman is
the Chief Counsel to the Departmental Disciplinary Committee of the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, First Judicial Department. The views expressed herein are his own and do not
necessarily represent those of the Departmental Disciplinary Committee or the Appellate Division.
1. John Shanahan, GiulianiCallsforFiringJurist Who FreedKiller,STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
NJ.), Feb. 15, 1996, at 18.
2. In re Atanga, 636 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (Ind.1994) (finding that a lawyer accused a judge,
in a widely circulated newsletter, of being "'ignorant, insecure, and a racist").
3. Susan Seager, Judge Sanctions Yagman, Refers Case to State Bar, L.A. DAILY J., June 6,
1991, at I.
4. James Mills, I Have Nothing to Do with Justice, LIFE, Mar. 12, 1971, at 56, 66.
5. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Grimes, 614 N.E.2d 740,740 (Ohio 1993) (finding that
a lawyer "referred to [a judge] as a 'sonofabitch,"' which was later reported in a local newspaper).
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I. THE REGULATORY SCHEME

At least since the adoption of the ABA Code in 1969,6 the
organized bar has recognized the need to restrict lawyers' statements
about judges. Thus, Canon Eight's DR 8-102(B) expressly provides that
a "lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge or
other adjudicatory officer."7 Although DR 8-102(B) only proscribes, for
disciplinary purposes, remarks about judges that are "knowingly false,"
EC 8-6 urges a broader restraint that recognizes the right of a lawyer to
criticize a judge publicly. Such criticism, however, must be in a dignified
manner so as to further the administration of justice.
While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such officials
publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use

appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and
intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal
system. Criticisms motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve
the legal system are not justified.8
The aspirational standard in EC 8-6, that a lawyer's public
comments critical of a judge or the judiciary should at least be
responsible, was to a degree incorporated in Rule 8.2 of the ABA Rules,
approved in 1983, 9 which has replaced the ABA Code in all but a
handful of states:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be
false or with reckless disregardas to its truth orfalsity concerning the

qualifications or integrity of ajudge, adjudicatory officer or public legal
officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal
office.' °

Thus, in most states today, lawyers may not ethically cast aspersions, which are made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless
disregard for the truth, on judges." In the few remaining ABA Code

6. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preface at ix (1985).

7. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-102(B) (1980).
8. Id. EC 8-6 (endnotes omitted).
9. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preface at viii (1992).

10. Id. Rule 8.2(a) (emphasis added).
11. In addition to the District of Columbia, 36 states follow an amended version of the ABA
Rules: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
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states, the reckless disregard standard, now explicit in Rule 8.2, will
likely be applied, and discipline will likely be imposed, even in the
absence of proof that the lawyer's statement was knowingly false.12
But whether or not a court narrowly interprets the ABA Code's
knowingly false standard, or an attorney's utterance is made with reckless
disregard for the truth, other provisions in the ABA Code or the ABA
Rules may apply which could subject the speaker to disciplinary
action.13 These provisions include the proscription against engaging in
"conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice";1 4 the ABA
Code's proscription against engaging in "undignified or discourteous
conduct which is degrading to a tribunal,"' 15 or its more narrowly drawn
ABA Rules counterpart, "conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal"; 6 and
the ABA Code's proscription against engaging in "conduct
that adversely
17
reflects on [the lawyer's] fitness to practice law."'
In sum, the letter and spirit of the current regulatory scheme permits
public criticism of judges so long as it is reasonably dignified and
intended to improve the administration of justice. While the courts will
undertake a case-by-case assessment, there can be little doubt that
lawyers who make false or reckless charges against sitting judges in
pending matters are subject to discipline.

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Seven of the remaining 14 states still retain a version of the ABA Code
(Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, and Vermont), six have incorporated a
mixture of the ABA Code and Rules (Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, and
Virginia), and California follows neither the ABA Code nor the ABA Rules. See STEPHEN GILLERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AD ETHICs 5 (4th ed. 1995); State Ethics Rules,
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABAIBNA) No. 165, at 01:3-:4 (May 29, 1995).
12. For example, long before the promulgation of the ABA Rules in 1983, a New York court
quoted with approval a referee's finding that a lawyer had made statements concerning a surrogate
judge "'with knowledge of their falsity and with reckless disregardof the truth."' Baker v. Monroe
County Bar Ass'n, 311 N.Y.S.2d 70,73 (App. Div. 1970) (per curiam) (emphasis added), afd, 272
N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1971). Similarly, "'the rule is well settled that an attorney who engages in making
false, scandalous, or other improper attacks upon a judicial officer is subject to discipline."' Id. at
74 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Bevans, 233 N.Y.S. 439, 443 (App. Div. 1929)).
13. See, e.g., In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1991) (finding that an attorney's false
accusations ofjudicial misconduct warranted discipline under DR 1-102(A)(6) of New York's Code
of Professional Responsibility (now DR 1-102(A)(8)), which prohibits conduct that adversely reflects
on a lawyer's fitness to practice law); see also infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
14. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d) (1992); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmIrrY DR 1-102(A)(5) (1980).
15. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmY DR 7-106(C)(6).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.5(c).
17. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmIrY DR 1-102(A)(6).
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CASE LAW

Described below are some of the leading New York, federal, and
other recent state precedents under which lawyers were disciplined for
exceeding the bounds of decorum and responsibility in their attacks on
judges.
A.

New York Precedent

In In re Holtzman,"8 the leading New York case pertaining to
intemperate and/or ill-conceived public criticism of a judge, the New
York Court of Appeals did not rely on DR 8-102(B) to uphold a charge
of misconduct leveled against the former Brooklyn District Attorney,
Elizabeth Holtzman.19 Instead, the court found that Holtzman had
violated New York's disciplinary rule, adopted from the ABA Code's DR
1-102(A)(6), which provides that a lawyer shall not "'[e]ngage in any
other conduct that adversely reflects on [the lawyer's] fitness to practice
law."' 20 The charges were based upon Holtzman's release to the media
of a false allegation about a judge who presided over a number of cases
prosecuted by her office. The appellate division had previously
sustained the grievance committee's finding that Holtzman falsely or
recklessly asserted that a judge had made a sex crime victim reenact the
sexual assault on the floor in his chambers; the incident was reported to
Holtzman approximately six weeks later, and she failed to perform any
further investigation of the matter before she chose to make the
allegations public.' Responding to Holtzman's contention that her
statements were protected by the First Amendment and the "constitutional malice" standard of New York imes Co. v. Sullivan,23 the court
stated that "[a]ccepting [Holtzman's] argument would immunize all
accusations, however reckless or irresponsible, from censure as long as
the attorney24uttering them did not actually entertain serious doubts as to
their truth."
Other New York cases also support the proposition that lawyers will
18. 577 N.E.2d at 30.
19. See id. at 32, 33.
20. Id. at 33 (quoting NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImIY DR 1-102(A)(6)
(now DR 1-102(A)(8))).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 31, 32.
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d at 34.
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be disciplined, notwithstanding the First Amendment, for spurious attacks
on judges. Recently, in In re Golub,' the appellate division censured
a lawyer for making vituperative public remarks about a judge. The
lawyer claimed, in the wake of an adverse determination in a high-profile
palimony lawsuit, that the judge was "'star-struck' and her decision
constituted a "'love letter"' to the defendant, a well-known actor.26
Although the lawyer's aspersions in Golub were directed at the judge's
alleged bias in favor of the defendant a public denunciation of a judge's
adverse ruling in the immediate aftermath of a high-profile case is fairly
commonplace. 27
Of less recent vintage, In re Markewicl s concerned a lawyer who,
in a speech at a public meeting, asserted that the decision of a certain
judge was dishonest because it favored a special interest group.29 The
lawyer told the gathering that the judge in question "deserved to be
impeached," and also stated that "it was fortunate that the Constitution
provided for the impeachment of judges, as otherwise the people might
resort to the noose, as they did at the time of Charles II.'' 3 Although
the lawyer maintained that he did not intend to offend the judge and later
apologized to the court, he was publicly censured.31 Similarly, in In re
Knight,32 the appellate division censured an attorney for writing and
publishing various letters which attacked numerous judges and characterized one as "'an incompetent, mendacious and otherwise grossly

25. 597 N.Y.S.2d 370 (App. Div. 1993).
26. Timothy Clifford, Hurt Not Marriedto Dancer: Court, NEWSDAY (New York City), Oct.
4, 1989, at 4; see also Vivienne Walt, Jennings' Lawyer Is on the Hot Seat, NEWSDAY (New York

City), Oct. 12,1989, at 31; Golub, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 371. The incident arose after New York Supreme
Court Justice Jacqueline Silbermann entered judgment for the defendant, movie star William Hurt,
in Jennings v. Hurt, No. 9736/88, 1989 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 868 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 3, 1989), aft'd, 554
N.Y.S.2d 220 (App. Div. 1990). See also Hal R. Lieberman, Lawyer Incivility Is Also Unethical,

N.Y. LJ., Nov. 15, 1993, at 1.
27. Such public denunciations are not only made by attorneys; government officials have also
been involved. The most striking recent example is the uproar following Judge Harold Baer, Jr.'s
suppression of drug evidence in United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), which
he subsequently reversed after an explosive public outcry in United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp.

211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See generallyLinda Greenhouse, Rehnquist JoinsFrayon Rulings,Defending
JudicialIndependence, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al; Alison Mitchell, Clinton PressingJudge
to Relent: President Wants a Reversal ofDrugEvidence Ruling,N.Y. Tims, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al;
Henry J. Reske, Questions oflndependence: Criticism,PoliticalMatters Heat Up Judges Conference,
A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 110.
28. 182 N.Y.S. 653 (App. Div. 1920).

29. See id. at 655.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 655, 657.
32. 34 N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Div. 1942).
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dishonest judge.""'3 The lawyer also said, with reference to two other
judges, that "'[flor a year and a half, I have been denouncing these two
low, skulking rogues from the house tops and to date neither of them has
had the guts even to cite me."' 34
The one New York case which arguably undermines the regulation
of intemperate lawyer attacks is Justices of the Appellate Division, First
Department v. Erdmann.3' Erdmann, a well-known Legal Aid lawyer
who later became a judge, was the subject of a Life magazine article
entitled I Have Nothing to Do with Justice, 6 in which he was quoted
as stating:
"There are so few trial judges who... rule on questions of law,
and leave guilt or innocence to the jury. And Appellate Division judges
aren't any better. They're the whores who became madams."
"I would like to [be a judge] just to see if I could be the kind of
judge I think a judge should be. But the only way you can get [a
judicial position] is to be in politics or buy it-and I don't even know
37
the going price.,
Although the appellate division censured Erdmann on the ground
that he was guilty of professional misconduct for using intemperate,
vulgar, and insulting language that undermined the integrity of the courts,
the court of appeals reversed in a per curiam decision with two judges
dissenting. 38 "Without more, isolated instances of disrespect for the law,
Judges and courts expressed by vulgar and insulting words or other
incivility, uttered, written, or committed outside the precincts of a court
are not subject to professional discipline."3' 9
Erdmann, whether or not still good law, is clearly distinguishable
from Holtzman and other New York precedents. For one thing,
Erdmann's was a generic attack on the judiciary as a body "outside the
precincts of a court," whereas in Holtzman and the other reported New
York cases, the lawyers' words were directed against a specific, sitting

33. Id. at 813.
34. Id.; see also Baker v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 311 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73 (App. Div. 1970)

(per curiam) (suspending an attorney who made a statement to a county bar association in which he
referred to "crooked judges" and attacked the integrity of the surrogate's court), affd, 272 N.E.2d

337 (N.Y. 1971).
35. 301 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1973), rev'gper curiam 333 N.Y.S.2d 863 (App. Div. 1972).

36. Mills, supra note 4, at 56.
37. Id. at 66.
38. See Erdmann, 301 N.E.2d at 427.
39. Id.
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judge before whom legal business was being conducted. This is an
important distinction; while statements that gratuitously demean the
judicial system should be avoided, attacks are far more harmful and
cause far more disrespect when directed at individual judges, who do not
have the means to defend themselves.40 This is particularly true when
a case is ongoing.
Of additional significance, Erdmann's comments, in context,
reflected no more than his opinion as to the state of the judiciary, albeit
in vulgar and unnecessarily provocative terms. By contrast, the comments
which most often lead to discipline are assertions about particular judges
(for example, "racist" or "crooked") which are amenable to the same type
of analysis concerning their falsity or recklessness as were the actionable
statements made by Holtzman, Golub, Markewich, and Knight.
B. FederalPrecedent
The distinction between critical remarks that represent merely the
speaker's subjective opinion versus false or reckless allegations of fact
lies at the heart of recent federal case law on this subject. In United
States District Court v. Sandlin,41 attorney John Sandlin appealed the
imposition of a six-month suspension. The lower court found that his
accusation, that a judge had tampered with a judicial transcript, was
made in reckless disregard for the truth.42 Although the Ninth Circuit
noted that a lawyer "does not surrender his freedom of expression" upon
admission to the bar, "he must temper his criticisms in accordance with
' Sandlin's allegations led the FBI
professional standards of conduct."43
to examine the court reporter's notes and the tape recording, but the
Bureau found no evidence of any illicit alteration. 4 Nonetheless, the
lawyer argued that his accusations had been made in good faith, shown
by his having passed two polygraph tests, thereby rendering the
statements protected speech under the First Amendment. a5 The Ninth
Circuit, however, rejected his claim that the statements were constitutionally protected. While agreeing that a subjective standard is employed in
defamation actions, the court stated that because of compelling state
interests an objective standard is warranted in the attorney disciplinary

40. See discussion infra Part m.
41.

12 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1993).

42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 864.
Id. at 866.
See id.
See id. at 866, 867.
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context. "'[B]ecause of the interest in protecting the public, the

administration of justice, and theprofession, a purely subjective standard
is inappropriate."' 4 6
47
Subsequently, in Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman,

the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the so-called "objective" test first enunciated
in Sandlin.48 Stephen Yagman had made a series of disparaging remarks
about a federal judge which included accusations that the judge's rulings
provided "'evidence of anti-semitism"' and that he was "'drunk on the
bench."'49 However, in reversing the sanction which the federal district

court imposed, the Ninth Circuit concluded not only that an allegedly
offensive comment must be viewed objectively, but also added a
requirement that the statement be shown to be factually false." The
disciplinary prosecutors, however, had offered no evidence that

Yagman's statements were in fact false. 1
52
Following Yagman, the Seventh Circuit decided In re Palmisano,

which involved an Illinois lawyer's reciprocal disbarment in federal court
for accusing certain judges of corruption, including allegations that
"'Judge Frank Siracusa is a crooked judge, who fills the pockets of his
buddies"' and "'Judge Lewis, another crook, started in about me."' 53
The court held that lawyers do not enjoy a constitutional right to accuse
judges of dishonesty when they have not investigated the truth or falsity

46. Id. at 867 (quoting In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 837 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)).
47. 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
48. "[Attorney disciplinary] proceedings are governed by an objective standard, pursuant to
which the court must determine 'what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his
professional functions, would do in the same or similar circumstances."' Id. at 1437 (quoting
Sandlin, 12 F.3d at 867).
49. Id. at 1434.
50. See id. at 1441-42. A careful reading of Yagman would support discipline in many cases
because, as the court held, even statements of opinion can be the basis for sanctions if such opinion
can "reasonably be understood as declaring or implying actual facts capable of being proved true or
false." Id. at 1439. The court illustrated this point by providing the following example:
The statement, "I think Jones is an alcoholic," for example, is an expression of
opinion based on implied facts, because the statement "gives rise to the inference
that there are undisclosed facts that justify the forming of the opinion." Readers of
this statement will reasonably understand the author to be implying he knows facts
supporting his view-eg., that Jones stops at a bar every night after work and has
three martinis. If the speaker has no such factual basis for his assertion, the
statement is actionable, even though phrased in terms of the author's personal
belie.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
51. See id. at 1438, 1441.
52. 70 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 1854 (1996).
53. Id. at 485.
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of their statements.' While purportedly adopting the same objective
standard that the Ninth Circuit applied in Yagman, the court evidently
disagreed with Yagman's conclusion-that it was up to the disciplinary
prosecutors to supply evidence of falsity.55
If Palmisano had furnished some factual basis for his assertions,
then we would need to determine whether either the Constitution or
principles of sound judicial administration permit a sanction-for an
attorney is not absolutely liable for every statement that turns out to be
incorrect. It would unduly quell investigation and exposure of
corruption to disbar an attorney who publicized suspicious conduct, just
because the suspicions were dispelled. Palmisano lacked support for his
slurs, however. Illinois concluded that he made them with actual
knowledge of falsity, or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.
So even if Palmisano were a journalist making these statements about
a public official, the Constitution would permit a sanction. False
statements, made with reckless disregard of the truth "do not enjoy
constitutional protection." 6
C. Other State Court Precedents
Similar to New York and federal courts, an abundance of state
courts have decided cases throughout the country supporting the principle
that lawyers cannot, on the pretext of exercising First Amendment rights,
simply vent their frustrations with the judicial system, or with particular
judges and their decisions, by accusing them of bias, incompetence, or
corruption. Thus, numerous state courts have issued opinions imposing
discipline on lawyers for making intemperate, disrespectful, unwarranted,

54. See id. at 487.
55. The court noted that "[e]ven a statement cast in the form of an opinion ("I think that Judge
X is dishonest") implies a factual basis, and the lack of support for that implied factual assertion may
be a proper basis for a penalty." Id.
56. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964)); accordIn re Evans, 801 F.2d
703, 706 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Grimes, 364 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir. 1966).
Compare Palmisanoto the reasoning forwarded by the court in UnitedStates v. Brown, 72
F.3d 25 (5th Cir. 1995). In Brown, the court ruled that a lawyer's motion for a new trial, which
included claims that the trial judge's gestures, facial expressions, and comments showed bias against
the lawyer's client, did not warrant suspension, see id. at 27, 28, under ethical rules prohibiting
"remarks about a judge that are false or made with a reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity."
Id. at 27. The court concluded that the lawyer's comments were made in the context of the judicial
process and that lawyers "should be free to challenge... a court's perceived partiality without the
court misconstruing such a challenge as an assault on the integrity of the court." Id. at 29.
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7
or contumacious public accusations against judges or their actions.
In one of the few divergent state court decisions, State ex rel.
58 the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Porter,
to impose discipline upon a lawyer who, immediately after the sentencing
of his client, told the news media that the presiding judge "'showed all
the signs of being a racist during the trial."' 59 Because the lawyer had
convinced the trial masters below that he "had a rational basis for having
concluded that the remarks had a factual basis,"60 the court based its
rejection of discipline on First Amendment grounds and evaluated his

conduct on that basis." Although the court noted that it had imposed
discipline in other cases where attorneys' comments had been "untrue or
outrageous to the point of demonstrating within their four corners that
they were wholly improbable and plainly false," 6 in the case before it
"no evidence was introduced to demonstrate that the statements were
false or that they were insincerely uttered by a speaker having no basis
upon which to found them."'63

57. See In re Riley, 691 P.2d 695, 704 (Ariz. 1984) (in bane) (public censure; lawyer's
statement that the "'state simply doesn't get a fair trial in [that judge's] court"); Florida Bar v.
Kleinfeld, 648 So. 2d 698, 701 (Fla. 1994) (three year suspension; lawyer impugned the "fairness
and honesty of a judge for the sole purpose of shopping for a more favorable forum"); In re Jafree,
444 N.E.2d 143, 149 (Ill. 1982) (disbarment; lawyer made "numerous scurrilous and defamatory
statements about the judiciary, and certain judges'); In re Atanga, 636 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (Ind.
1994) (30 day suspension; lawyer accused a judge, in a widely circulated newsletter, of being
"'ignorant, insecure, and a racist' and 'motivated by political ambition"); In re Freriehs, 238 N.W.2d
764, 765 (Iowa 1976) (public admonishment; lawyer's statement, in a petition for rehearing, that the
court was "'willfully avoiding the substantial constitutional issues"' in the case); Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ky. 1980) (public reprimand; lawyer characterized a judge's
decision as "'highly unethical and grossly unfair' at a press conference); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406, 408 (La. 1983) (one year suspension; lawyer's public accusation that a
judge was 'dishonest, corrupt,"' and was either "'blackmailed' or .'accept[ed] bribes to influence
his decision"); In reRaggio, 487 P.2d 499,500 (Nev. 1971) (per curiam) (public reprimand; lawyer,
a district attorney who was a potential candidate for governor or U.S. senator, characterized a
Nevada Supreme Court decision as "'shocking and outrageous,"' and as "judicial legislation at its
very worst"'); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Grimes, 614 N.E.2d 740, 740 (Ohio 1993) (public
reprimand; lawyer, while speaking with a reporter, "referred to [a judge] as a 'sonofabitch"); In re
Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250, 251 (S.D. 1979) (public censure; lawyer remarked to the press that "'state
courts were incompetent and sometimes downright crooked, Judge Adams excepted"). See generally
W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Attorney's Criticism of JudicialActs as Ground of DisciplinaryAction,
12 A.L.R.3d 1408 (1967).
58. 766 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1988).
59. Id. at 961.
60. Id. at 969.
61. See id. at 966-69.
62. Id. at 968.
63. Id.
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Foreshadowing the standard later enunciated in Yagman, the

decision in Porterforwarded an objective test which requires a showing
that a lawyer's statement is actually false, if the lawyer subjectively
believed that the statement was truthfi,
before discipline can be

imposed. 64 In contrast, most jurisdictions, including New York, use a
much narrower objective test to evaluate the falsity of a lawyer's

statements. 65
Finally, in Committee on Legal Ethics v. Farber,66 the West

Virginia Supreme Court dealt with a lawyer who accused a judge of
covering up an arson. When confronted by the government with the
inaccuracy of his assertion, the lawyer further alleged that the judge was
part of a Masonic conspiracy.67 The court rejected, in strong terms, the
defense that the lawyer's subjective belief in the veracity of his

accusations constituted sufficient justification for protection under the
First Amendment:
There is courage, and then there is pointless stupidity. No matter
what the evidence shows, respondent never admits that he is wrong.
Indeed, sincere personal belief will, in the sweet bye and bye, be an
absolute defense when we all stand before the pearly gates on that great
day of judgment, but it is not a defense here when respondent's
deficient sense of reality inflicts untold misery upon particular
individuals and damage upon the legal system in general. s

64. Going one step further, concurring Justice Opala urged for the adoption of a completely
subjective test: "Even if... the Bar had followed up with a formal and particularized offer to prove
that the respondent's remarks were false in fact, no discipline would be imposable here.
Respondent's constitutional freedom of speech does not depend on the truth of its content." Id. at
970.
65. For example, a lawyer, unhappy with a judge's decision, alleged that there was a
conspiracy between the judge and the opposing party. See In re Disciplinary Action Against Graham,
453 N.W.2d 313, 318 & n.3 (Minn. 1990). Despite the lawyer's apparently genuine belief that his
statement was true, he had no facts to support his accusation and was suspended for 60 days; the
court specifically articulated an objective test. See id. at 322, 324.
In a similar ruling, a lawyer was disciplined for asserting that the judge had "'made up his
mind"' before hearing the case. In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). The
court rejected the lawyer's claim that his actionable statement was only an opinion, not a statement
of fact, calling that argument an "artificial dichotomy" and noting that a lawyer cannot screen
himself from the disciplinary rule by adding "I believe" to the beginning ofotherwise offensive comments. Id. at 833.
66. 408 S.E.2d 274 (W.Va. 1991).
67. See id. at 283-84.
68. Id. at 285.
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Lawyers' intemperate, personal attacks against sitting judges, let
alone statements lawyers make that are knowingly false or in reckless
disregard of the truth, severely undermine the administration of justice.
Lawyers are not merely "officers of the court" in a legal or theoretical
sense; in the public's eye, they are knowledgeable, professional
spokespersons whose seemingly authoritative comments are accorded
greater attention and deference than statements of any other observers.
The reasons for restricting lawyers' unwarranted criticisms of
judges, especially in pending cases, are thus readily apparent.
Irresponsible attacks have a very real likelihood of subverting the dignity
and authority of the courts. They also detract from other effective and far
more appropriate remedies for a judge's poor decisions, including appeal
to a higher court, collateral relief, or referral to a state commission on
judicial conduct in cases that raise serious issues of misconduct.
Moreover, in many state systems judicial accountability is ultimately
dealt with by election or the reappointment process.
If lawyers' statements are accorded greater attention and credence
than comments by others, then lawyers can also do far more damage to
a judge's professional reputation by making unwarranted attacks. Unlike
other public officials, judges are barred by law and judicial ethics from
defending their actions or commenting publicly on matters pending in
any court.69 Perhaps for that reason, the duty of lawyers to speak out
against improper personal attacks on judges is explicitly recognized in
the Ethical Considerations of the ABA Code, which provide that
"[a]djudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are
entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism."7 The
corollary to this proviso is also found in the ABA Rules: "To maintain
the fair and independent administration ofjustice, lawyers are encouraged
to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly
criticized."7'
From the standpoint of fundamental fairness then, lawyers should be
limited to criticism that is offered in a courteous and professional manner
for the purpose of improving the administration of justice and, for the

69. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(13)(9) (1990).
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-6 (1980).
71. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 8.2 cmt. (1992).
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same reason, should be the first to speak out against irresponsible attacks.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is beyond dispute that the substance of a judicial decision or
opinion is an appropriate topic for public discussion. Moreover, when a
lawyer on a case disagrees with a determination, the disagreement can be
zealously articulated on appeal, by way of a collateral proceeding, or
before a judicial conduct commission in appropriate cases where
misconduct may be involved. Lawyers on a case also have the right to
publicly criticize the substance of a decision in a professional, temperate
manner.
However, when comments to the press turn from criticism of a
decision on the legal or factual merits to personal attacks on the judge or
his or her motives, especially in the absence of evidence to support such
allegations, they impugn the entire judiciary and undermine public
confidence in the judicial system. Moreover, individual judges are not
free to refute such aspersions in a pubic forum. For these reasons,
whenever the line is crossed from legitimate criticism to spurious attack,
attorney discipline is warranted in order to maintain the integrity of the
bar and the dignity of the courts.
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